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Abstract Scholars debate the ambitions and policies of today’s ‘rising powers’ and
the extent to which they are revising or upholding the international status quo. While
elements of the relevant literature provide valuable insight, this article argues that the
concepts of revisionism and the status quo within mainstream International Relations
(IR) have always constituted deeply rooted, autobiographical narratives of a
traditionally Western-dominated discipline. As ‘ordering narratives’ of morality and
progress, they constrain and organize debate so that revisionism is typically conceived
not merely as disruption, but as disruption from the non-West amidst a fundamentally
moral Western order that represents civilizational progress. This often makes them
inherently problematic and unreliable descriptors of the actors and behaviours they are
designed to explain. After exploring the formations and development of these concepts
throughout the IR tradition, the analysis is directed towards narratives around the
contemporary ‘rise’ of China. Both scholarly and wider political narratives typically tell
the story of revisionist challenges China presents to a US/Western-led status quo,
promoting unduly binary divisions between the West and non-West, and tensions and
suspicions in the international realm. The aim must be to develop a new language and
logic that recognize the contingent, autobiographical nature of ‘revisionist’ and ‘status
quo’ actors and behaviours.
Introduction
Scholarly debates over ‘rising powers’ have intensified as China, India and
others have become increasingly prominent, and as the United States (US) is
said to be in decline. Often, these debates are framed by the language of
‘revisionism’ and the ‘status quo’. Historically, states have been identified as
revisionist or status quo actors based, respectively, on either dissatisfaction or
satisfaction with their place in international affairs. Recently, authors have
sought to advance the debate by distinguishing between thick and thin revi-
sionism (Behravesh 2018) and different ideal types (Goddard 2018). Davidson
(2006, 14) argues that revisionist states ‘seek change in the distribution of
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[global] goods’, highlighting ‘territory, status, markets, expansion of ideology,
and the creation or change of international law and institutions’ as crucial are-
nas of revisionist ambition. States quo actors, in contrast, seek to maintain the
distribution of these goods.
‘Rising’ China attracts notable attention within the relevant international rela-
tions (IR) literature today, and among those who directly examine whether it is
a revisionist or status quo actor, most agree that it more closely resembles the
latter (for example, Johnston 2003; Davidson 2006; Ding 2010; Ikenberry 2011;
Xiao 2015; Wilson 2017). Zhao (2018, 2) rejects the ‘status quo’ designation, but
still argues that ‘it is not a revolutionary power discontented with and ready to
replace the order’. Some scholars also critique IR theory for being overly deter-
ministic and materialistic, taking for granted that rising powers will challenge
the status quo (Thies and Nieman 2017, 2; Ward 2017, 281; Gries and Jing 2019).
Often overlooked, they argue, is how ‘ideational factors’, such as socialization
(Thies and Nieman 2017, 3, 15) and perceptions of status (Ward 2017) affect
behaviour. Despite this emerging critique, however, the spotlight of scholarly
and popular attention continues to fall upon China—and other ‘rising powers’—
as a real or potential source of international revisionism. China, in short, is
regarded as guilty until proven innocent (Turner 2014, 154) regardless of stated
evidence to the contrary by scholars such as those identified above. Meanwhile,
attention to Western revisionism in particular remains more limited, despite
scholars of the US and Europe outlining the actions and ambitions of these
actors towards revising and reshaping the structures of global affairs.
Consider for example the European Union (EU), a core strength of which is
said to lie in its designs ‘to reshape the contours of the international system’
(Rosecrance 1998, 15). Ian Manners (2002, 239) notes Brussels’s ‘willingness to
disregard Westphalian conventions’ in its efforts ‘to shape conceptions of
“normal” in international relations’. Indeed, the EU fulfils most of the criteria
for revisionism suggested by Davidson (2006), for example by significantly
expanding its territorial reach from six member states in 1951 to 28 today;1
transforming Europe’s markets and acting as a global ‘market power’ that
‘actively and consequentially influences today’s international system’ (Damro
2012, 697); and exporting its ideology via particular understandings of democ-
racy, human rights and so on, acting as a ‘normative power’ (Merlingen 2007)
or a ‘norm entrepreneur’ (Vadura 2015). In line with earlier definitions of revi-
sionist powers, which centred around power accumulation, the EU has also
elevated itself to ‘the status of emerging global power’ (Piening 1997) or even
‘superpower’ (Moravcsik 2014). Despite all this the EU has rarely, if ever, been
labelled revisionist.
The US today is deemed revisionist by some, though primarily as resulting
from the policies and worldviews of the administration of Donald Trump (for
example, Ikenberry 2017). The same has been argued of the US under the
administration of George W. Bush (see Xiang 2001; Hurd 2007). Such allowan-
ces for the role of isolated, ‘rogue’ administrations or individuals, as deviations
from imagined national norms, are rarely, if ever, extended to China and other
‘rising powers’. The notion of a hegemon or ‘established power’ on its own
terms representing a primary disruptive force within the system it dominates
1 Reducing to 27 if the UK leaves the EU as currently planned.
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is far less frequently considered (for example, Bukovansky 2016; Schweller
2015; Chan et al. 2018).
Newer frameworks designed to better conceptualize ‘revisionist’ and ‘status
quo’ actors are productive in correcting definitional deficiencies and providing
more nuance to previously under-theorized terms. Yet, no matter how sophisti-
cated the concepts become, their inherent performativity remains neglected
when they are deployed throughout the discipline of IR and the wider policy
realm. This presents a need to interrogate the discursive logics that underpin
these concepts and give them meaning. A primary concern of this article is
thus to investigate the scholar as narrator, and to reveal how prevailing under-
standings of ‘revisionism’ and the ‘status quo’ emerged and established them-
selves, for what purposes, and with what effects.
This article posits that the concepts of revisionism and the status quo reflect
and reproduce ‘ordering narratives’ of morality and progress which sustain
selective logics about the world and the actors within it. They organize debate
so that revisionism is most typically—though not exclusively—conceived as
disruption from the non-West amidst a fundamentally moral Western order
that represents civilizational progress.2 Narratives of international revisionism
and the status quo have long worked to construct and legitimize understand-
ings of a (principally Western-led) global status quo and the universal advan-
ces it brings, in the apparent face of challenges from global peripheries.
International relations understandings of revisionism and the status quo are
thus less products or outcomes of enquiry than modes or methods of enquiry
that operate as autobiographical narratives. Only by uncovering such a ‘wider
logical dimension’ (Somers and Gibson 1994, 44) of these frequently recurring
terms can their underlying intelligibility be revealed. This enables a demon-
stration of the consequences—in both the academy and beyond—for the world
and its actors which these concepts describe.
We do not argue that modern-day ‘rising’ China should escape examination
as a source of global change. Beijing has created international organizations
such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and launched contin-
ental-scale projects like the Belt and Road Initiative while aggressively assert-
ing territorial claims in the South China Sea. Yet, the overriding attention that
China and other ‘rising powers’ receive as potential sources of revisionism,
despite such actors as the EU and US conforming to the criteria for revisionism
provided by IR scholars themselves, is illustrative of the extent to which the
terms ‘revisionist’ and ‘status quo’ are problematic descriptors of actors and
behaviours they are routinely used to explain.
The article proceeds as follows. The first section outlines the nature and
role of narratives in the study of global affairs. The second section unpacks
traditional IR wisdom on revisionism and the status quo, tracing its evolution
across two overlapping waves of twentieth-century debate. We then focus on a
contemporary third wave of debate, which centres around a ‘rising’ China in
particular. Finally, we outline resistance, or counter-narratives, to these trad-
itionally dominant IR stories of international revisionism and the status quo,
2 The terms ‘(non-)West’ and ‘Western’ are to some degree problematic because of their lack
of specificity, but we consider them useful for the purposes of this article. We address the inherent
malleability of their constructions on page 11.
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and how they nevertheless penetrate wider public and policy arenas. The art-
icle concludes by looking to how a new language and logic (Somers and
Gibson 1994, 44, 62) of ‘revisionist’ and ‘status quo’ actors and behaviours
might be formulated.
The nature, role and power of narratives
Narratives are a central feature of social and political life. As discursive tools
they construct stories about the world that are crafted and selective, omitting
certain parts while emphasizing others (Subotic 2016; Hagstr€om and
Gustafsson 2019). As Patterson and Monroe (1998, 316) explain, they also
require agency and characters. They are thus at least partly autobiographical,
providing comforting and compelling stories about who ‘we’ are, where ‘we’
came from and ‘our’ collective purpose. They speak to the relationship
between Self and Other, giving us ‘a sense of space and a sense of place’
(Subotic 2016, 612), or ‘a sense of speakers’ cognitive maps’ of themselves and
others (Patterson and Monroe 1998, 316). Narratives therefore contain the per-
spective of the narrator(s), and their understanding of what is right or
‘canonical’. They also contain sequences of events which may or may not be
‘real’, but which are organized in ways that give them meaning. Indeed, ‘the
narrator uses the past self to point to and explain the present and the future’
(Patterson and Monroe 1998).
Somers and Gibson (1994) describe four different but interlinked narrative
dimensions. Conceptual narratives are those with which this article is primarily
concerned. Used by scholars in particular, conceptual, or scholarly, narratives
give meaning to such terms as ‘society’, the ‘actor’, ‘culture’ and so on which,
for ‘social science purposes’, are intentionally abstracted from their historicity
and relationality (Somers and Gibson 1994, 62). Like each of the dimensions
Somers and Gibson describe, conceptual narratives ‘have drama, plot, explan-
ation, and selective appropriation’ (Somers and Gibson 1994, 61). Ontological
narratives are used by individual actors in a broader sense to comprehend their
existence, to know who they are and how to act. ‘Agents’, Somers and Gibson
explain, ‘adjust stories to fit their own identities, and, conversely, tailor
“reality” to fit their stories’. Most importantly for this analysis, the social or
interpersonal nature of these narratives means they can form wider collectives
or ‘webs’ of narrativity. These public narratives are those attached to larger cul-
tural and institutional formations, including the family or church, but also the
government and the nation. Narratives, indeed, are an important component
in the policy-making process, promoting certain practices while restricting the
possibility of others (Subotic 2016).
Metanarratives are grand or universal narratives in which we are embedded
as social actors and as social scientists. They can include the ‘epic dramas of
our time’, such as barbarism/order versus civilization/chaos, as well as pro-
gression/advancement and the envisioned triumph of international liberalism.
By usually operating at the ‘presuppositional level’, beyond our immediate
awareness (Somers and Gibson 1994, 63), metanarratives can become so
ingrained as to be difficult to recognize as organizing concepts. Finally, certain
narratives may become dominant by latching on to pre-existing narratives,
achieving resonance. However, even dominant narratives remain contested by
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alternative stories (Autesserre 2012, 207–208), and we address these as counter-
narratives later in the article. In spite of an ongoing contestation, narrative
changes usually occur slowly and incrementally (Autesserre 2012, 209). This is
evident in the spotlight continuing to fall on China as potentially revisionist,
despite the majority of empirical studies concluding that it is not.
As examined throughout the remainder of the article, the dominant story of
a historically Western-centric IR has been that of an essentially moral and pro-
gressive world order formulated and sustained by the West (or, before then,
an Anglo-American world), on the one hand, and that of a non-West that jeop-
ardizes the stability and advancements the West has enabled, on the other.
These ‘ordering narratives’ of morality and progress are forms of metanarra-
tives which encompass social actors including IR scholars, having become
‘lodged in the theoretical core of social theory’ (Somers and Gibson 1994, 63).
Ingrained and largely unchallenged, they offer a story of international revision-
ism and the status quo which comes with a dual logic. Like all narratives, they
bring order by steering and regulating debate around the rise and fall of great
powers. However, as metanarratives, they also establish truths about inter-
national order itself—about what it is, how it came about, the condition it is in
and where it is going. Notions of international order bind and give meaning to
the concepts of revisionism and the status quo and, as shown in due course,
must be central to the process of extricating those concepts from the narrative
constraints that have been imposed.
By reinterpreting the concepts of revisionism and the status quo as narra-
tives, we show how they bring a particular way of sense making, with inher-
ently performative, rather than merely descriptive, functions. The power of
narratives lies in their effects, and the aim here is to reveal the formations and
consequences of the narratives we explore. We examine the scholar as narrator
operating through the creation and deployment of powerful conceptual IR nar-
ratives that not only represent, but also select and restrain, our knowledges of
the world and the identities and motivations of the actors within it. We further
show how these narratives transcend the discipline, connecting to and perme-
ating political practice (see Winkler 2019; Gustafsson et al. 2019).
The following section details how scholarly debate on revisionism and the
status quo has been historically organized by conceptual narratives, enabling
IR theorists to advance and sustain stories of international revisionism princi-
pally as a form of non-Western disruption of a Western status quo that has
benevolent and moral foundations and represents civilizational progress.
Morality and progress: narrating revisionism and the status quo in the
IR tradition
Revisionism and the status quo as designators of (im)morality
Scholarly—or conceptual—narratives on international revisionism and the sta-
tus quo have extensive roots, broadly evolving in three distinctive but inter-
connected waves. Each also shares the critical commonality of being framed at
least in part by the language of international (im)morality.
Morality and progress 411
The first wave emerged among classical realists of the mid twentieth cen-
tury. Hans Morgenthau (1962, 39) distinguished status quo from imperialist
powers, arguing,
A nation whose foreign policy tends toward keeping power and not toward changing the
distribution of power in its favour pursues a policy of the status quo. A nation whose
foreign policy aims at acquiring more power … [and] seeks a favourable change in
power status, pursues a policy of imperialism.
Other post-war realists spoke of ‘satiated’ and ‘insatiated’ (Schuman 1948),
‘status quo’ and ‘revolutionary’ (Kissinger 1957) and ‘status quo’ and
‘revisionist’ (Wolfers 1962, 18) states. Randall Schweller argues that, in contrast
to Wilsonian liberals, who saw the world through a moral lens as a global con-
flict between good (democratic) and bad (non-democratic), classical realists
saw ‘a natural power struggle between the established, satisfied powers and
the rising, dissatisfied ones—often the victors and vanquished in the last major
power war’. In this view, realists were concerned only with how ‘the concept
of power politics applied equally to both “haves” and “have nots”, sated and
hungry states’ (Schweller 1999, 18).
Yet this interpretation misses what John Hobson (2012, 185–187) calls the
‘subliminal Eurocentric institutionalism’ of realism and IR theory more widely,
and, ultimately, the subtle presumptions of (im)morality which underpin the
discipline’s revisionism–status-quo debates. At this stage, revisionism and the
status quo remained broadly under-theorized concepts, their Eurocentrism
being manifest in subtle ways. Specifically, studies tended to concentrate upon
conflicts between ‘expansionist’ and ‘unsatisfied’ Germany and the Axis
powers of non-Western Europe, which challenged the ‘pacific’ and ‘satisfied’
Anglo-American/Western European powers and their visions of international
order. Thus, ‘[t]he alliance treaties that France concluded with the Soviet
Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania [sic] in the period between the
two world wars were intended to maintain the status quo, mainly in view of
possible German attempts to change it’ (Morgenthau 1962, 41). Morgenthau’s
understanding of imperialism as virtually any expansionist behaviour freed
colonial Western nations of responsibility by naturalizing violent imperialist
projects, particularly throughout the non-Western world. Western colonizers
that maintained the size of their empires are also seen by classical realism as
status quo actors (Hobson 2012, 188–189).
In this first, formative wave of debate around revisionism and the status
quo, we perhaps inevitably find uncertainties and complexities in the narrative
being constructed. EH Carr, for example, identified Britain as a ‘“pacific” and
“satisfied” Power, finding her highest good in the maintenance of the status
quo and defending herself against the imperialism and expansionism of others’
(Carr 1939a, 26–27). Equally, and exhibiting ‘a multiple series of intellectual
identities’ including a belief ‘in the essential beneficence of British governing
power’ (Cox 2000, 213), Carr (1939, 136) also questioned Western moral claims
to global leadership, arguing that ‘[i]nternational morality, as expounded by
most contemporary Anglo-Saxon writers, became little more than a convenient
weapon for belabouring those who assailed the status quo’.
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A second wave of revisionist/status quo scholarship came with realism’s
structural turn of the 1970s. This brought some refinement to the IR narrative
and its developing story of international revisionism and the status quo, but also
a continuation of Hobson’s subliminal Eurocentrism. The hegemonic stability
theory (HST) of the 1970s/1980s, for example, tells us that as new states ‘rise’ the
established order is disrupted. Moreover, it is ‘open and liberal’ economic orders
that are particularly vulnerable to fragmentations of power and that require a
hegemonic power to thrive (Gilpin 1987, 72). Such orders, Gilpin explains, have
emerged twice: during so-called Pax Brittannica of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, and Pax Americana since 1945. Organski and Kugler’s power transi-
tion theory (PTT) posits that, as the capabilities of a ‘rising power’ approach
those of a dominant power, the former will try to seize control of the inter-
national environment, increasing the likelihood of conflict. Thus, ‘the source of
war is to be found in the differences in size and rates of growth of the members
of the international system’ (Organski and Kugler 1980, 20). Also crucial are lev-
els of satisfaction with the rules and norms of the order maintained by the dom-
inant power; ‘If the newly rising country … is dissatisfied with the international
status quo, it will demand changes which will likely be resisted by the dominant
state.’ This combination of approaching power parity and dissatisfaction with
the prevailing order ‘provides the necessary condition for war’ (Lemke 1997, 24).
Models such as the PTT and HST extolled the virtues of objective enquiry.
Yet their conceptual narratives of revisionism and the status quo were always
those of a discipline that remained a fundamentally Western enterprise.
Almost all IR theory, note Acharya and Buzan (2007, 288), ‘is produced by and
for the West, and rests on an assumption that Western history is world his-
tory’. Traditional IR theories, they argue,
speak for the status quo great powers and the maintenance of their dominant role in the
international system/society. Though they are presented as universal theories … [they]
can be seen as speaking for the West and in the interest of sustaining its power,
prosperity and influence. (Acharya and Buzan 2007, 3).
For instance, when Gilpin identifies just two historical eras of ‘liberal’ sta-
bility and order, provided once by the United Kingdom (UK) and then the US,
the familiar moral foundations of the HST are revealed.
The argument could be that these IR narratives of revisionism and the sta-
tus quo simply represent the reality of a world only ever truly ‘ordered’ by the
West. Largely absent, however, is a serious consideration of how the global
manufacturing of ‘order’ by European colonial powers and, later, the US, in
the Americas, Africa, Asia, and elsewhere, constituted radical and widespread
revisionism. Discriminatory and autobiographical, these narratives rarely
accommodate concern for the disruptive, violent and arguably immoral proc-
esses that brought the ‘Western order’ about. The concern is instead only about
its potential demise and of who and what may follow.
Revisionism and the status quo as civilizational progress
The concept of an international order, or ‘status quo’, as it commonly appears
throughout the two historic waves of (Western-dominated) IR literature
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outlined above, is not imagined to be a static or unmoving condition. Instead,
it has always been used within scholarly or conceptual narratives as code for
advancement and progress. Robert Gilpin (1987, 72) insists that ‘the inter-
national economic order … could not flourish and reach its full development’
without a liberal hegemonic power such as the US or UK. Potential hegemons
such as the Soviet Union, he explains, would undo such progress through ‘the
imposition of political and economic restrictions’. EH Carr’s criticisms of
Western claims to international order intersected with assertions of how it
advanced, rather than merely sustained, the global condition. Aside from
‘equal security to all’, he noted, British ascendancy gave rise to a universal cur-
rency, acceptance of free trade and a common language. The fate of each of
these developments, and by extension the cultivation of ‘a world society’, he
argued, was threatened by new challengers (Carr 1939, 213).
Progress has been most commonly understood in the West as a product of
Enlightenment thought, manifest in material advances in science and technol-
ogy as a ‘standard of civilization’.3 This enabled a division of the world into a
‘civilized’ West and ‘barbarian and savage’ non-West (Buzan and Lawson
2015, 22–98). As progress became an explanation of how history itself unfolds,
a storyline emerged describing a linear trajectory from ancient Greece to mod-
ern Europe in which progress was understood as self-generating through char-
acteristics internal to the West (Buzan and Lawson 2015, 36–98), including
those of liberal capitalism. The West was seen as ‘a distinctive political order—
a “civic union”’ and as having ‘a distinctive political logic’ (Deudney and
Ikenberry 1993, 18), in line with portraying the ‘democratic world [as]
America’s greatest accomplishment’ (Deudney and Ikenberry 2012, 1). Though
not necessarily directly visible, the underlying ‘wisdom’ or logical dimension
of this narrative persists today through notions of ‘modernization’ and
‘development’ (Buzan and Lawson 2015, 123). More explicitly, when referring
to post-1945 history, the growth of US global influence is depicted as having
‘helped usher in a new period of modernization and progress for many parts
of the world’ (Deudney and Ikenberry 2012, 4).
While comparisons between ‘civilized’ and ‘uncivilized’ are less acceptable
in modern parlance, the ‘status quo’ is still narrated as a route towards pro-
gress and development. The goal of wealth creation in particular is set within
a framework of global governance defined by Western conceptions of democ-
racy, human rights and capitalist reforms. ‘As in the past’, observe Bowden
and Seabrooke (2006, 3f), ‘the workings of markets continue to be thought of
as having a “civilising” effect on society; both internally amongst its members
and in external relations with other societies’. In this ‘socialization-to-liberal-
order-view’ (Bukovansky 2016, 96), emerging markets are paternalistically
depicted as moving towards a brighter future, via the ideal of economic con-
vergence with the more developed West. For example, Mandelbaum (1997)
suggests that a ‘useful way to think of Russia and China is as analogous to
unruly adolescents’ in the context of their post-Cold-War development. This is
coupled with expectations of political convergence and thinking in terms of
the ‘liberal theory of history’ (Nymalm 2013) and understandings of the
3 For discussion of Enlightenment (counter-)narratives on progress, which lies beyond the
scope of this article, see Pitts (2009).
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relationship between capitalism and modernity which have arguably become a
Western-centric hegemonic view. Argues Jan Nederveen Pieterse (2008, 1),
‘ideas of convergence upon the model of Anglo-American capitalism and lib-
eral democracy are continuously rehearsed in mainstream media, as if the “rise
of the rest” is supposed to follow in the footsteps of the rise of the West’.
Failed expectations on convergence may in turn intensify a threat discourse of
the ‘rising other’ (Nymalm 2017) and ‘revisionism’ they bring.4 For instance,
Jaschob et al. (2017) deny any normative connotation in their conceptualization
of revisionism, as ‘not all rules and norms are just, and not all existing inter-
national orders are better than potential alternatives’. Yet, they motivate their
studies with ‘the problem of dissatisfied great powers and the question of why
rising powers should want to challenge an established international order that
facilitated their extraordinary growth’ (Jaschob et al. 2017, 10). In other words,
the order is ‘good’ because it enabled the rise of new powers.
Historical IR debates over revisionist and status quo actors and behaviours
have evolved over time, but within the controlled and restrictive parameters of
conceptual IR narratives. As a result, the concepts themselves have operated
not as neutral descriptors, but as powerful narratives of morality and progress
with particular characters and plotlines. The effect has been to leave these
scholarly concepts devoid of much analytical value, operating more as rhet-
orical tools to reinforce misleadingly binary conceptions of a Western Self ver-
sus a non-Western Other, within unduly selective and essentially
predetermined stories of world order and the sources of its vulnerabilities.
More than this, by endorsing divisions of a ‘civilized’ West and ‘barbarian’
rest, they have worked to promote suspicions and tensions in the international
realm. As John Hobson (2012, 185–187) puts it, models like the HST ‘explicitly
justif[y] Western imperialism in the past, as well as in effect advocating a neo-
civilizing mission in the present’.
Robert Gilpin’s theory of hegemonic stability (later adapted by others),
underpinned by Pax Brittanica and Pax Americana narratives, depicts the
UK and US as architects of the only two true historical world orders. Yet
global history reveals earlier ‘orders’ and constant interchange between East
and West (Stuenkel 2016, 34–47; Hobson 2004). This calls into question the
traditionally narrated sequence of events, by challenging the understanding
that world order is fundamentally Western and the first of its kind in terms
of scope and reach (see Suzuki et al. 2013). As an essentially autobiograph-
ical account of world order, from a traditionally Western-centric IR
discipline, the HST thus obscures others from the plotline, writing them out
of history. This second-wave logic, moreover, is inexorably drawn from the
original, first-wave disciplinary stories of how ‘pacific’ and ‘satisfied’
powers, notably the UK and US, defended against imperialism and
expansionism that threatened the stability and civilizational achievements of
the Anglo-American order. These narrativized truths went largely unchal-
lenged, becoming common sense to the extent that they still reside at the
heart of mainstream IR theory.
4 See, for example, Friedberg (2018, 8–9) and Wright (2017, preface) on ‘the end of
convergence’.
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To better explore the contemporary manifestations and effects of these nar-
ratives, we turn now to examine the latest wave of IR debate around inter-
national revisionism and the status quo, which centres primarily upon the
modern-day ‘rise’ of China.
Narrating the modern-day ‘rise’ of China in IR and beyond
A third wave of revisionist/status quo literature came with post-Cold-War
debates over the US-led world order and emergence of ‘rising powers’.
Authors in this wave utilize the logic of the PTT to interrogate the contempor-
ary ‘rise’ of China in particular (see for example Lim 2015; Goldstein 2007). As
Lemke (1997, 32) explains, threats to the post-war ‘Long Peace’ have now
seemingly emerged, notably from ‘Chinese growth unaccompanied by a
change in attitude toward the status quo’. To assuage these threats, ‘the
United States and other leading satisfied Great Powers should continue patient
cooperation with [China, and others such as Russia] … to encourage democra-
tization and liberalization’. For Gerald Segal (1996, 108), ‘China is a powerful,
unstable non-status quo power.’ China is also now argued to be demonstrating
‘significant revisionist objectives’ in the South China Sea (Lim et al. 2017) as
well as by creating the AIIB (Wilson 2017, 150). Graham Allison writes that
‘war between the U.S. and China is more likely than recognized at the
moment’, as his interpretation of the historical record stipulates that, in the
majority of cases ‘in which a rising power has confronted a ruling power, the
result has been bloodshed’ (Allison 2015).5 Beyond the PTT, a significant sub-
literature explores whether rising powers in general, and especially a rapidly
rising China, represent revisionist or status quo powers (see for example Ding
2010; Feng 2009; Kastner and Saunders 2012). We return to the role of these
narratives in the policy realm in the next sub-section on public narratives.
Third-wave IR debates around rising powers, then, quietly sustain the log-
ics of the ordering narratives of morality and civilizational progress central to
the first and second waves, perpetuating largely unquestioned understandings
that international revisionism must inevitably emanate from beyond the
Western core of international order. To begin with, the term ‘rising power’ is
not neutral, bringing powerful connotations of instability and danger absent in
such alternatives as ‘modernizing’ or ‘developing’. Crucially, the term ‘rising’,
like ‘revisionist’, powers has most typically been used to refer only to non-
Western states (see Turner 2014, 152–154). As noted earlier, the EU is rarely
labelled ‘revisionist’ despite revisionism forming part of its self-identity.
Explorations of the US as revisionist are also relatively absent, though counter-
narratives exist, as examined shortly. The selective formations and constraining
boundaries of mainstream conceptual IR narratives prevent the inclusion of
the US and EU because the term does not logically fit the known character
or plotline.
The assumption here is not of an unproblematic separation between the
‘West’ and ‘non-West’, or of timeless challenges the latter poses to the former.
Fears over a ‘rising’ India, for instance, rarely enter US security discourse as
5 On critiques of Allison’s case selection see, for example, Chan et al. (2018).
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do those of a ‘rising’ China, despite numerous material similarities and both
typically being identified as residing beyond the West. Moreover, and as
already shown, earlier waves of IR revisionism–status-quo debate interrogated
the vulnerabilities of the Anglo-American/Western order to Imperial and Nazi
Germany. That Germany is now routinely located within the West, alongside
members of the ‘Anglo-American world’, demonstrates the fluidity of such
imagined geographies. Indeed, India’s broad absence from US threat dis-
courses is explained partly by its (re)construction as a pseudo-member of the
Western world (Turner 2016). Similarly, while post-1945 Japan quickly became
seen as part of the Western Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) world, by the 1970s and 1980s it was ‘orientalized’
because its economic growth generated concerns of a challenge to US economic
hegemony (Nymalm 2017). Today, it is those actors commonly labelled ‘non-
Western’, in particular China, that have in many ways been seamlessly man-
oeuvred into spaces of IR debate once occupied by Wilhelmine and Nazi
Germany. Members of ‘the West’ escape such interrogation, while China, like
others before it, is now ideationally tied to well-rehearsed discourses of the
enemy because its imagined Otherness makes it seemingly logical to do so (see
Rousseau 2006).
Mainstream scholarly/conceptual narratives of a ‘rising’ China are thus in
important ways autobiographical narratives of Western authorship, with their
meanings contingent on the worldview of a particular, prevailing (Western)
disciplinary tradition.6 The ‘cognitive map’ of this tradition locates uncertainty
and disorder, and an unravelling of gains made by the so-called liberal world
order, as coming not from the central characters within it but from the global
peripheries. China has become locked within narrativized understandings of
what constitutes international order, on the one hand, and disorder (or chaos/
backwardness/barbarism), on the other, and not only within academic circles.
For centuries within wider US politics and society, China has been represented
as lacking the essential standards of civilization and as a corresponding threat
to US security and its enlightened, progressive values (Turner 2013). Chengxin
Pan points to self-reflecting Western narrations of the ‘China threat’ when he
argues that the ‘threat’ derives at least partly from the American self. ‘Thus, to
fully understand the U.S. “China threat” argument, it is essential to recognize
its autobiographical nature’ (Pan 2004, 313). This equally applies to expecta-
tions of China developing according to the Western model of liberal demo-
cratic capitalism. This kind of convergence thinking has been a recurrent
theme in US China policy (Nymalm 2013).
As highlighted earlier, among those who directly interrogate the question
of whether ‘rising’ China exists as a revisionist or a status quo actor, most
agree that it more closely resembles the latter. Despite this, it is China and
other ‘rising powers’ that are routinely interrogated as potential sources of
instability. This apparent contradiction is enabled by the power of narratives
6 To an extent every concept is contingent on author worldviews and disciplinary tradition.
We do not deny, therefore, that if the IR discipline had been authored primarily beyond the West
then the concepts of revisionism and the status quo might have become understood in terms that
privilege another cultural region. In this article, however, we interrogate the dominance of
narratives that happen to be of largely Western design. Equally, this does not mean ‘non-Western’
perspectives are devoid of problems. See, for example, Callahan (2008).
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to steer and select our knowledges of the world and its constituent actors.
First- and second-wave IR debates around international revisionism and the
status quo cemented the disciplinary (conceptual) narrative of an imperial/
unsatisfied non-Western threat to a stable Anglo-American/Western world
order. Third-wave debates over China’s ‘rise’ align with, and reinforce, this
story by retaining its authors as the central protagonists, most notably the US,
before introducing China as the latest outsider to a functioning system, which
it necessarily threatens to destabilize. The findings of the recent sub-literature
within these debates on the explicit question of China as a revisionist or a sta-
tus quo actor have not disrupted the more ingrained, overarching ‘truth’ that
China should remain the principal object of study.
Counter narratives and public narratives: the reach of revisionist–status-quo wisdom
Resistance to the dominant narratives of non-Western revisionism of a US/
Western-led status quo exists. Xiang (2001, 9) points to a ‘determined
American assault on the status quo’ by the (2000–2009) Bush administration.
Ian Hurd (2007) similarly posits that the Bush-era US displayed revisionist ten-
dencies around international norms. Andrew Hurrell (2005, 164) goes further:
‘the United States has always been a revisionist state, whether this has been
reflected in crusading or in exemplarism’. Randall Schweller (2015, 13) simi-
larly argues that the US is ‘the True Revisionist Power’, and that ‘it is hegem-
ons … that are best positioned and most motivated to be revisionist powers’
(see also Schweller 2018). Maximillian Terhalle (2015, 198) also criticizes the IR
tendency to portray the US as a status quo power; ‘the United States has never
hesitated to employ its more revisionist foreign policy traditions’. More
broadly, Terhalle questions IR’s Western-centrism and its ‘narrative according
to which the United States and the United Kingdom have successfully led the
international order for the last 200 years’. By privileging this false notion of
historical Western order, we overlook ‘the prevalence of collective hegemonies
for most of the time’ (Terhalle 2015, 22, 109). Counter-narratives are also evi-
dent among those who consider a non-Western or global IR theory (for
example, Acharya and Buzan 2007; Eun 2018). Authors here challenge the
underpinning theoretical knowledges that have enabled the enduring Euro/
Western-centrism of concepts such as revisionism and the status quo. We
return to the significance of these counter-narratives for more productive IR
debates in the conclusion.
These counter-narratives challenge the discipline’s dominant conceptual
narrative to the extent that they identify revisionism as equally likely to eman-
ate from the West, particularly the US, as from the non-West. For those like
Xiang and Hurd, however—and as explained in the introduction—the US is
represented as a revisionist actor only within a particular moment and with
the mitigating circumstances of a peculiarly disruptive governing elite, that is,
the Bush (see also Shambaugh 2001; Lind 2017) or, more recently, the Trump
(Ikenberry 2017), administration.
Schweller’s (2018, 40) argument that the US transformed from a status quo
to a revisionist power after the Cold War when it achieved ‘unchecked power’
is a useful critique of IR’s dominant conceptual narratives as outlined above
(see also Chan et al. 2018). However, his structural realist explanation, framed
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by the understanding that states’ revisionist/status-quo tendencies are primar-
ily determined by their relative material power, is not equipped to show how
the traditional theoretical assumptions he addresses—which ‘invariably posit
rising powers as spoilers, hell-bent on revising the international order’
(Schweller 2015, 3)—have endured for so long, or why the disciplinary trend
has been to interrogate the intentions and behaviours of ‘spoilers’ from the
non-West, and with what effects. Thus, his explanation is not designed to
show how the IR concepts of revisionism and the status quo have expressed
the worldviews of particular (especially Western) narrators, constraining the
limits of the debate itself. Terhalle, meanwhile, criticizes both the neglect of
the revisionist character of US politics (for example, Terhalle 2015, 32–33, 84,
198) and the Western/Anglo-centrism of IR theory in its account of history (for
example, Terhalle 2015, 110ff). With an alternative focus, however, he does not
explicitly relate this critique to how the notions of ‘revisionism’ and ‘status
quo’ in IR are applied. Nor does he trace or unpack the terms as narratives
that convey a story on their own, or connect them to the study of China (and
other rising powers) as revisionist.
Ultimately, the counter-narratives that exist have not yet significantly chal-
lenged the discipline’s dominant conceptual narratives. Ordering narratives of
morality and progress have created a binary of positive/benevolent and nega-
tive/threatening, brands of international revisionist motivations and behav-
iours towards an imagined status quo. Positive and/or benevolent revisionism
is within the rules, taken for granted and rarely labelled as such. It is typified
by the ‘normative power’ of the EU and a similar (though, as indicated above,
less extreme) comparative lack of interest in a revisionist US. As in-house revi-
sionism by the principally Western architects of the system, such revisionism’s
purpose is narrated as benign and aimed at fine-tuning an inherently progres-
sive order from which, while not flawless, the world is understood to profit
and advance. Negative/threatening revisionism is considered disruptive not
merely to a stable system but to the progress and advancement that system is
designed to bring. Negative revisionism means instability, regression and a
real or potential reversal of gains. Attached to actors like China, it is deemed
worthy of interrogation, generating the need for debate about world peace
(Buzan 2010) and the survival of the international system (Ikenberry 2008).
Neither has resistance prevented conceptual narratives of revisionism and the
status quo from disseminating into wider public (especially governmen-
tal) narratives.
The Trump administration labels China (and Russia) a ‘revisionist power’
in both its 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) (White House 2017a) and its
2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) (Department of Defense 2018). This label
is justified on the basis that China aims ‘to shape a world antithetical to U.S.
values and interests … displace the US in the Indo-Pacific region and reorder
the region in its favour’ (White House 2017a, 25). When the NDS speaks of ‘a
resilient, but weakening, post-WWII international order’ undermined by China and
Russia, it points to potential global regression and a dismantling of ‘the long-
standing rules-based international order’ (Department of Defense 2018, 1–2,
emphasis in original; see Breuer and Johnston 2019). ‘In short, they are contest-
ing our geopolitical advantages and trying to change the international order in
their favour’ (White House 2017a, 27).
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To support its claims of China as nefariously revisionist with designs to
reshape the global landscape, the NSS cites China’s attempts to export its
state-centric economic model and enhance its military capabilities, and its use
of data and surveillance. Yet, throughout the same document, comparably
‘revisionist’ motivations and behaviours are presented as essential elements of
a benevolent US policy programme. The theme of ‘advancing American influ-
ence’ recurs. To do this, it is argued, the US should ‘play a catalytic role in
promoting private-sector-led economic growth’, build and deploy ‘the most
effective military in the world’ and ‘continuously pursue strategic intelligence’.
The American aim of ‘advancing religious freedom’ is also promoted (White
House 2017a, 4, 3, 32, 41).
To reiterate an earlier point, narratives are prescriptive, bringing under-
standings of how the world should be as an inextricable component of the pol-
icy-making process, their ‘truths’ and logic enabling certain practices while
precluding others. ‘Narratives do not cause action. Instead, they … authorize,
enable, and justify specific practices and policies … Over time, the narratives
and the practices they authorize come to be taken as natural, granted, and the
only conceivable ones.’ Importantly, narratives also resonate more, with
greater potential to become dominant or commonsensical, when they can latch
on to pre-existing narratives (Autesserre 2012, 207). The aim here, then, is not
to draw a causal link between conceptual or ordering narratives, on the one
hand, and public/government narratives or foreign policy decisions on the
other. It is to show where the narrativized worldviews of the Trump adminis-
tration connect, or ‘latch on’, to those of the scholarly IR literature, and to
examine the political practices they enable.
In 2017, US National Security Advisor HR McMaster argued that revisionist
powers like China seek to ‘subvert the global order that undergirds our com-
mon … economic prosperity’ (White House 2017b). At least in part on the
basis of this type of understanding of negative revisionism, or subversion,
towards a system that has brought wealth and prosperity, from July 2018
Washington began applying wide-ranging tariffs on Chinese imports (The
Economist 2018). These public narratives worked also to preclude a continu-
ation of what the NSS refers to as Washington’s post-Cold-War ‘strategic com-
placency’ in global affairs. ‘Given the new features of the geopolitical
environment the United States must renew key capabilities to address the chal-
lenges we face’ (White House 2017a, 26, 28). In March 2018 the US Congress
approved Trump’s military spending bill which proposed a US$61 billion
increase to the national defense budget (Myre 2018). US Pacific Command was
also rebranded the Indo-Pacific Command, to better encapsulate the view not
only that China’s ‘rise’ brings the need for material support from key partners
such as India, but also that the US–India partnership is one of ‘responsible
stewards’ of international ‘peace and stability’ (Ministry of External Affairs
2017; see also Turner 2016).
Whatever one’s normative position on US/Western liberalism versus
Chinese state-centrism, the tensions within the 2017 NSS around China as an
explicitly negatively revisionist actor and the US as implicitly positively revi-
sionist demonstrate the ‘successful’ operations of public narratives.
Comparable behaviours in one actor can be morally promoted in the name of
upholding the status quo and ensuring global progress, while in others can be
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portrayed as immoral and regressive. These apparent contradictions are recon-
ciled by the overarching power of largely unquestioned ordering, or meta-,
narratives in which the sources of (Western) order and potential (non-Western)
chaos are already ‘known’. China’s ambitions to expand its capabilities and
influence, moreover, constitute negative revisionism not simply because they
emanate from the non-West, but because China’s so-called state-driven project
runs counter to beliefs in democratic-capitalist American ideals. China is thus
not ‘converging’ as expected; the perceived threat from authoritarianism is ref-
erenced heavily throughout both the NSS and NDS. While the US is cast as a
benevolent guide for China’s inclusion in the post-war liberal international
order, it is China that is frustrating these attempts: ‘For decades, U.S. policy
was rooted in the belief that support for China’s rise and for its integration
into the post-war international order would liberalize China. Contrary to our
hopes, China expanded its power at the expense of the sovereignty of others’
(White House 2017a, 25).
Conclusion: rethinking the terms of the debate
Chan et al. (2018, 23) argue that, as social and political constructions, the labels
of ‘revisionism’ and the ‘status quo’ ‘are often intended to frame discourses
intended for political persuasion and mobilization, and sometimes bear little
correspondence with what the pertinent states have said and done’. The ideas
these labels bring, they suggest, can exert power and influence on our under-
standings about the world even when grounded upon questionable evidence.
This article has argued that the IR concepts of revisionism and the status quo,
as they are typically deployed, are constructions in the form of ‘ordering narra-
tives’ of morality and progress, constituting long-established and, to a signifi-
cant extent, autobiographical stories—or conceptual narratives—of a Western-
dominated discipline. Through their selectivity of characters, plotlines and
sequences of events in stories of an essentially benevolent and progressive
Western world order, these narratives have framed and constrained debate
across historical waves of study, their broadly unchallenged logic now being
transposed on to a ‘rising’ China. As modes or methods of enquiry, these nar-
ratives have promoted understandings of world order and of the characters
within it. To varying extents, Morganthau, Gilpin and others—as both scholars
and narrators—articulated conceptions of international revisionism and the sta-
tus quo which (albeit often subtly) privileged the Anglo-American, and later
the wider Western, world in the making of an essentially benevolent and pro-
gressive system, simultaneously entrenching stories of external others who
came late to threaten its achievements. Coated in the subliminal Eurocentism
described by Hobson, the potential analytical value of these concepts has
always been stifled; formulated as inherently problematic and misleading
descriptors of international actors and behaviours, they have reinforced overly
simplistic conceptions of a Western Self versus a non-Western Other, promot-
ing rather than addressing suspicions and tensions in the international arena
and pervading wider public narratives such as those of the current US
administration.
To reiterate, the argument is not that China should be omitted from the
study of structural changes to twenty-first-century global affairs, nor is it to
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deny challenges associated with China’s authoritarian model of governance
and development. Yet, as we have seen, assessments and classifications of revi-
sionism are contingent and narrativized and, traditionally, authored principally
in the West. Those who directly examine whether ‘rising’ China exists as a
revisionist actor broadly agree it does not. However, China remains the pri-
mary focus of study of international revisionism, while actors like the EU
escape such attention despite seemingly fulfilling revisionist criteria formulated
by some IR scholars themselves. Neither, then, is the argument that the terms
‘revisionism’ and ‘status quo’ should necessarily be removed from the lexicon.
It is that examinations of their disciplinary formations and the conditions from
which they derive meaning help us recognize them as contingent constructs
and, from a position of greater self-reflection, enable efforts to resolve the
problems and contradictions they bring.
The bias towards upholding conventional IR wisdom is increasingly being
interrogated. Stephen Walt speaks of history as ‘a set of competing, overlapping,
but still distinct narratives … The past does not reveal itself to us openly; it is inter-
preted, debated, and constructed for us by historians of various kinds and by soci-
ety as a whole’ (Walt 2018). In doing so, he emphasizes the role of narratives in the
production and perpetuation of ‘truths’ of how the world came to be. Walt also
connects the tendency of IR ‘to reinforce the stale bipartisan consensus behind
“liberal hegemony” and the necessity for “U.S. leadership”’, or, in the words of the
Trump administration, the US as a ‘responsible steward’ of order (Ministry of
External Affairs 2017). In their explication of conceptual or scholarly narratives,
Somers and Gibson (1994, 62) argue that researchers should seek to ‘develop a
social analytic vocabulary that can accommodate the contention that social life,
social organizations, social action, and social identities are narratively, that is, tem-
porally and relationally constructed’. The duty of IR, then, should be to work for
an analytical logic and language that recognize the narrativized nature of inter-
national revisionism and the status quo, and of international order itself. 7
Attempts at such vocabularies so far problematize either geographical/his-
torical or conceptual boundaries and binaries. In his call for a global IR, for
example, Acharya (2014) urges scholars to look beyond the Westphalian model
of order to those of historical periods and regions, as well as different frame-
works of relations including alternative forms of regionalism (see Ling and
Nakamura 2019; Chen and Shimizu 2019). Critiquing IR for overlooking peace-
ful interactions and bidirectional learning between the West and non-West,
Acharya points to a resulting loss of mutual respect (Acharya 2014, 656).
Scholars such as Stuenkel (2016) and Hobson (2004) critique what they con-
sider false dichotomies between the West and non-West, and their accompany-
ing narratives of Western-derived modernity. In other words, without
entrenched and historically inaccurate binaries between ‘a moral and progres-
sive West’ and an ‘immoral and uncivilized rest’, equally established notions
of revisionism and status quo would be exposed as more problematic.
Seeking to break or expand conceptual boundaries, scholars offer ‘new’
imaginaries or vocabularies. Womack, for example, proposes replacing ‘status
quo’ (the situation of the present) and our understanding that it represents the
7 While noted elsewhere (for example, Smith 1999), this insight has not yet fully permeated
IR debate on revisionism and the status quo.
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norm, with ‘status ad quem’, ‘the situation to which (we are moving in the
future)’. In his understanding, discussions on whether China supports the
‘status quo’ or not are misplaced, as world politics is not a static or fixed con-
dition. Accordingly, ‘a “status ad quem power” would be one whose policies
were appropriate and sustainable in the emerging new order’ (Womack 2015,
135). Ling (2018) explores US–China relations through different theoretical,
ontological and even ‘spiritual’ lenses, including ‘Daoist trialectics’, while Pan
(2018) develops a ‘holographic relational ontology’ of China’s rise. Kavalski
(2018) uses the notion of guanxi to advance existing relational approaches by
focusing on the interconnectedness of knowledge production in the West and
‘non-West’. Collectively, these approaches offer more complex narratives of
China’s ‘rise’ than the ‘binary scenarios of either a hegemonic challenge to the
Western-dominant order or a linear integration into it’ (Pan 2018, 19), in which
both China and ‘the West’ are treated as ‘self-enclosed and self-interested units
of power’ (Ling 2018, 5). While increased complexity is probably not in high
demand with policymakers who favour simpler accounts, we find one of our
central tasks as scholar-narrators in exposing what we see as problems with
dominant accounts and in highlighting alternative voices. As noted by
Kavalski (2018, 3): ‘IR theorizing [still] needs to learn and employ different lan-
guages if it is to offer a richer and more nuanced account of the complex and
heterogenous global life it seeks to comprehend.’
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